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A Talent is a Terrible Thing to Waste: Toward a
Workable Solution to the Problem of Restrictive
Covenants in Employment Contracts
Angela M. Cerino*
INTRODUCTION
The present day employment contract often contains a clause
prohibiting the employee from working for a competing firm
should the present employment relationship cease. Such a promise
is known variously as an employee noncompete agreement, a cove-
nant not to compete or a restrictive covenant.' Such covenants are
used in a number of fields, including computer programming and
* Assistant Professor of Business Law, Villanova University. B.A., 1972, Temple Uni-
versity; J.D., 1975, Temple University School of Law. The author would like to thank Dean
and Professor John E. Murray, Jr. of Villanova University School of Law for his generosity
in reading an earlier draft. The author assumes full responsibility for the ideas contained
herein, however, as they are her own. The author also appreciates the research assistance of
Carolyn Crawford, a student at Villanova University School of Law, whose work was helpful
in the Solutions section of this article.
1. For discussions of the law relating to employee noncompete agreements in specific
states, see the following: Georgia: Comment, A Fresh Look: Lowering the Mortality Rate of
Covenants Not to Compete Ancillary to Employment Contracts and to Sale of Business
Contracts in Georgia, 31 EMORY L.J. 635 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Lowering the Mortality
Rate of Covenants Not to Compete]; Illinois: Kanwit and Conway, Enforcement of Restric-
tive Covenants in Illinois Employment Contracts, 60 CHI. BAR REc. 142 (1978); Maryland:
Rosen and Loewy, Restrictive Covenants in Maryland Employment Agreements: A Guide
for Drafting, 11 U. BALT. L. REV. 377 (1982); Massachusetts: Note, Recent Developments
Concerning Employee Covenants Not to Compete: A Quiet "Corbinization" of Massachu-
setts Law, 12 NEW ENG. L. REV. 647 (1977); North Carolina: Comment, Injunctive Russian
Roulette and Employment Noncompetition Cases: A.E.P. Industries v. McClure, 63 N.C.L.
REV. 222 (1984); Pennsylvania: Comment, Enforcement of Restrictive Covenants In Penn-
sylvania Employment Contracts, 80 DICK. L. REV. 693 (1976); South Dakota: Comment, Em-
ployee Restrictive Covenants: Unscrupulous Employees vs. Overreaching Employers, 27
S.D.L. REV. 220 (1982); Texas: Comment, Noncompetition Covenants in Employment Con-
tracts: A Texas Common Law Analysis, 20 Hous. L. REV. 1197 (1983); Virginia: Note, Em-
ployee Covenants Not To Compete: Where Does Virginia Stand?, 15 U. RICH. L.R. 105
(1980).
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data processing,2 sales,3 medicine,' management,5 employment
counselling,' accountancy, 7 beauty culture,$ radio and television, 9
and banking. 10 However, in the field of law, an American Bar Asso-
ciation disciplinary rule prohibits attorneys from entering into
noncompete agreements."
The variety of contractual .post-employment restrictions is seem-
ingly endless.1 2 One type of restraint designates a geographical area
within which the employee may not work after the termination of
the present employment relationship. For example, the employee is
often prohibited by his or her employment contract from working
for a competitor within a certain distance of a particular city"3 or
within a given county"' or state. 5 Other contracts seek to prevent
the employee from competing in certain portions of several
2. See infra notes 106-13 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 39-74 and accompanying text. A significant number of the em-
ployee covenants not to compete cases before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court during the
past 30 years have dealt with the contracts of sales representatives.
4. See infra notes 75-97 and accompanying text. For examples of covenants not to
compete among medical professionals in other states, see J.M. Reddy, M.D. v. Community
Health Found. of Man, 298 S.E.2d 906 (W. Va. 1982); Odess v. Taylor, 282 Ala. 389, 211 So.
2d 805 (1968); Middlesex Neurological Assoc., Inc. v. Cohen, 3 Mass. App. 126, 324 N.E.2d
911 (1975); Home v. Radiological Health Serv., 83 Misc. 2d 446, 371 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1975);
Cogley Clinic v. Martini, 253 Iowa 541, 112 N.W.2d 678 (1962); Foltz v. Struxness, 168 Kan.
714, 215 P.2d 133 (1950); and Wilson v. Gamble, 180 Miss. 499, 177 So. 363 (1937).
5. See infra notes 98-123 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 119-23 and accompanying text.
7. See Annot., 15 A.L.R. 4th 559 (1982).
8. See infra note 37.
9. See Annot., 36 A.L.R. 4th 1139 (1985) (discusses enforceability of noncompete cov-
enants involving radio or television personalities).
10. See infra notes 114-18 and accompanying text. See also Grebing v. First National
Bank of Cape Girardeau, 613 S.W.2d 872 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (bank loan officer).
11. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsImILITy, DR 2-108 (1980). But see Adler v.
Barish, 252 Pa. Super. 553, 382 A.2d 1226 (1977); Kalish, Covenants Not to Compete and
the Legal Profession, 29 ST. L. LAW J. 423 (1984).
12. For a good analysis of post-employment restrictions by type, see Lowering the
Mortality Rate of Covenants Not to Compete, supra note 1, at 635.
13. See Herman v. Dixon, 393 Pa. 33, 141 A.2d 576 (1958) (covenant prohibited com-
petition within 15 miles of the city of Pottsville); Morgan's Home Equipment Corp. v. Mar-
tucci, 390 Pa. 618, 136 A.2d 838 (1957) (covenant prohibited competition within 100 miles of
city of Philadelphia); Pankas v. Bell, 413 Pa. 494, 198 A.2d 312 (1964) (covenant prohibited
competition within 10 miles of downtown Pittsburgh). See also Gagliardi Bros., Inc. v.
Caputo, 538 F. Supp. 525 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (covenant prohibited competition within 100 miles
of West Chester, Pennsylvania).
14. See New Castle Orthopedic Assoc. v. Burns, 481 Pa. 460, 392 A.2d 1383 (1978)
(Eagan & Larsen, J.J., concurring) (Roberts & O'Brien, J.J., dissenting) (employee prohib-
ited from competing anywhere in Lawrence County, Pennsylvania).
15. See Pennsylvania Funds v. Vogel, 399 Pa. 1, 159 A.2d 472 (1960) (contract prohib-
ited all competition in the state of Pennsylvania).
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states,16 or even in several states in their entirety."
Another form of area restriction attempts to limit an employee's
competition in what the employer perceives to be its sphere of in-
fluence. For example, an employee may be asked not to compete
within a certain distance of a particular office where he or she was
employed." In other instances, the employee is asked not to com-
pete within a certain radius of any office of the employer.19 In still
other cases, the employer bars the employee from competing in the
"employer's territory" 20 or soliciting the business of certain cus-
tomers of the employer.21
Employment contracts have also placed time restrictions on the
post-employment right of an employee to work for a competitor.
These have been used in combination with or in place of area re-
strictions. Such clauses have usually stated that the employee may
not engage in the same business as the employer for a certain pe-
riod of time after the cessation of employment. Time restraints of
one or two 23 years duration are commonplace.
16. See Sidco Paper Co. v. Aaron, 465 Pa. 586, 351 A.2d 250 (1976) (employee had
agreed not to compete in "any area of which Richmond, Virginia, is the southern point,
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, the western point and Boston, Massachusetts, the northern
point").
17. See Jacobson & Co. v. International Env't Corp., 427 Pa. 439, 235 A.2d 612 (1967)
(employee had promised not to compete in the states of New York, New Jersey, Pennsylva-
nia, Delaware and Connecticut).
18. See Hayes v. Altman, 424 Pa. 23, 225 A.2d 670 (1967) (the employee had agreed
not to compete in the town in which the office was located or elsewhere within six miles of
the employer's office).
19. Fortunately, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not enforced such agreements
without at least amending them to make their scope more reasonable. In Albee Homes, Inc.
v. Caddie Homes, Inc., 417 Pa. 177, 207 A.2d 768 (1965), for example, the agreement pro-
vided that the employees were not to compete within 50 miles of any sales office of the
company, but the court limited enforcement to 50 miles from the office where the employees
had actually worked. Ten years later, in Fox-Morris Assoc., Inc. v. Conroy, 460 Pa. 290, 333
A.2d 732 (1975), the court affirmed the county court's refusal to grant injunctions against
the defendant employees who, by the terms of their covenants were barred from "engaging
in a competitive business within a one-hundred-mile radius of any place where [the plaintiff
employer] had offices." However, Justice Roberts, in his concurring opinion, argued that the
contract should have been partially enforced.
20. See Boldt Mach. & Tools, Inc. v. Wallace, 469 Pa. 504, 366 A.2d 902 (1976); Girard
Investment Co. v. Bello, 456 Pa. 220, 318 A.2d 718 (1974); Capital Bakers, Inc. v. Townsend,
426 Pa. 188, 231 A.2d 292 (1967).
21. See John G. Bryant Co. v. Sling Testing & Repair, Inc., 471 Pa. 1, 369 A.2d 1164
(1977); Pennsylvania Funds Corp. v. Vogel, 399 Pa. 1, 159 A.2d 472 (1960).
22. See Bettinger v. Carl Berke Assoc., Inc., 455 Pa. 100, 314 A.2d 296 (1974); Capital
Bakers, Inc. v. Townsend, 426 Pa. 188, 231 A.2d 292 (1967); Albee Homes, Inc. v. Caddie
Homes, Inc., 417 Pa. 177, 207 A.2d 768 (1965); Morgan's Home Equip. Corp. v. Martucci,
390 Pa. 618, 136 A.2d 838 (1957); Plunkett Chem. Co. v. Reeve, 373 Pa. 513, 95 A.2d 925
(1953).
23. See Sidco Paper Co. v. Aaron, 465 Pa. 586, 351 A.2d 250 (1976); Jacobson & Co.,
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Sometimes, a contract lacks an area term, a time restriction, or
both. Courts have frequently viewed this omission depending, of
course, on the phrasing, as an unenforceable attempt to prohibit
the employee from competing anywhere at all.
24
Promises or covenants not to compete are important to those
who are bound by them-the employees whose careers they will
influence. They are also important to society because of their im-
pact upon employment and unemployment. By affecting the avail-
ability of workers to the people who rely upon them, such cove-
nants are vitally important to prospective employers and clients.
This article suggests that the balance ought to be tipped more
heavily in favor of employees and their clients.
BACKGROUND
There is more than a half millennium of judicial precedent on
the subject of employee noncompete agreements.2 5 Early decisions
steadfastly upheld the right of a former employee to work for
whomever he pleased, and restrictive covenants were viewed as un-
enforceable restraints of trade.2 A shortage of workers is believed
to have been related to this total rejection of restrictions on former
employees.2 7
Some types of covenants not to compete are still unenforceable
in most jurisdictions although there is no widespread labor
Inc. v. International Env't Corp., 427 Pa. 439, 235 A.2d 612 (1967); Pennsylvania Funds
Corp. v. Vogel, 399 Pa. 1, 159 A.2d 472 (1960).
24. See Trilog Assoc., Inc. v. Famularo, 455 Pa. 243, 314 A.2d 287 (1974); Peripheral
Dynamics, Inc. v. Holdsworth, 254 Pa. Super. 310, 385 A.2d 1354 (1978).
25. See Michel v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wins. 181 (K.B. 1711); Colgate v. Bacheler, Cro. Eliz.
872 (1596); The Blacksmith's Case, 2 Leo. 210, 3 Leo. 217 (1587); The Dyer's Case, Y.B. 2
Hen. 5, P1. 26 (1415). For a discussion of these English cases, as well as the early American
cases, see Carpenter, Validity of Contracts Not to Compete, 76 U. PA. L. REv. 244 (1928).
26. The Dyer's Case, Y.B. 2 Hen. 5, P1. 26 (1415). The notion that employee promises
not to compete were illegal restraints of trade disappeared for a long time, but made a
comeback during the 1970's. See Goldschmid, Antitrust's Neglected Stepchild: A Proposal
for Dealing with Restrictive Covenants Under Federal Law, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1193 (1973);
Janssen, Antitrust Considerations in Proceedings Against Former Employees Who Com-
pete Against Their Former Employer, 31 Bus. LAW. 2063 (1976); Sullivan, Revisiting the
"Neglected Stepchild". Antitrust Treatment of Post Employment Restraints of Trade,
1977 U. ILL. L.F. 621 (1977); Note, The Antitrust Implications of Employee Noncompete
Agreements: A Labor Market Analysis, 66 MINN. L. REv. 519 (1982). Despite the arguments
of many commentators, the courts have not looked with favor upon the resurgence of the
theory that post-employment limits on competition unduly restrain trade.
27. Carpenter, supra note 25, at 244-45; see also Morgan's Home Equip. Corp. v. Mar-
tucci, 390 Pa. 618, 627, 136 A.2d 838, 844 (1957).
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shortage in the United States today. For example, a promise not to
compete, when not ancillary to a contract, is unenforceable as an
unlawful restraint of trade. But where the covenant is subsidiary to
or ancillary to a legally enforceable transaction, and is itself sup-
ported by consideration, it is sometimes enforceable." "Ancillary"
covenants not to compete often accompany an employment con-
tract, the dissolution of a partnership, or the sale of the goodwill of
a business.
Courts have distinguished covenants against competition ancil-
lary to the sale of business goodwill from those ancillary to an em-
ployment contract. The following excerpt from Dean Murray's
treatise explains this distinction:
In the sale of a business, unless the good will in the hands of the buyer is
protected, the whole purpose of the sale may be frustrated since the essen-
tial value of many business entities is found only in their good will. Thus,
unless an agreement restricting the seller from interfering with the funda-
mental subject matter of the sale is enforced, no effective sale can occur
.... The purpose of another common type of restraint, the agreement of
an employee not to compete after his employment is terminated, is typically
quite different .... Therefore, it has been aptly suggested that, "courts
properly should, and do, look more critically to the circumstances of the
origin of post-employment restraints than to the circumstances of other
classes of restraints.
3 0
The law does, in fact, view post-employment restraints more
critically than other types of restrictions on competition. Some
states prohibit all or most forms of them by statute."' Most states
28. E.g. Maintenance Specialties, Inc. v. Gottus, 455 Pa. 327, 314 A.2d 279 (1974);
Sheinman v. Cohen, 6 Pa. D. & C.3d 261 (1977).
29. J. MURRAY, MURRAY ON CoNTRACTs 705 (1974).
30. Id. at 707, citing Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARv. L. REV.
625, 647 (1960).
31. State statutes prohibiting or limiting such post-employment restraints include: Al-
abama: AI.A. CODE § 8-1-1 (1975); California: CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 1964);
Colorado: COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-113 (1973)(however, the statute permits employee noncom-
pete agreements where the employer wishes to recover the costs of educating or training an
employee or where the employee is an executive or staff member of an executive); Louisiana:
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23.921 (West 1964)(a maximum two-year restriction is permitted,
however, if the employer has trained or advertised for the employee); Michigan: MIcI
Comp. LAWS § 445.761 (1967); North Dakota: N.D. CEm. CODE § 9-08-06 (1960); Oklahoma:
OKLA. STAT. tit. 15 § 217 (1966); South Dakota: S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 53-9-8 (1980).
Other state statutes do not actually prohibit non-competition agreements but rather codify
common case law concepts. See, e.g., Florida: FLA. STAT. § 542.33 (1980)(agreement is au-
thorized if it is reasonably limited in time and area); Wisconsin: WiS. STAT. § 103.465 (1981-
82) (contract would be valid if reasonably necessary for the protection of the employer); or
Hawaii: HAWAII REV. STAT. § 480-4 (1980) (such covenants are permissible if limited to such
time as may be reasonably necessary for the protection of the employer without imposing
1986
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have case decisions which limit the circumstances under which
such contracts will be enforced.3 2 Pennsylvania, which enforces em-
ployee noncompete agreements readily, has set certain guidelines
for ascertaining whether a given agreement will be enforceable. In
the 1976 case of Sidco Paper Company v. Aaron,33 the Pennsylva-
nia Supreme Court summarized the law regarding the enforceabil-
ity of post-employment non-competition clauses as follows:
Our courts will permit the equitable enforcement of post-employment
restraints only where they are incident to an employment relation between
the parties to the covenant, the restrictions are reasonably necessary for the
protection of the employer, and the restrictions are reasonably limited in
duration and geographic extent."
As will be shown in this article, this rule is not necessarily the
one being applied in actual practice in Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania
case decisions show an unexplained correlation between the em-
ployee's profession and the enforcement by the court of post-em-
ployment contract restrictions. Highly-paid, highly-skilled work-
ers,3 5 such as computer experts, physicians, corporate executives
and entrepreneurs have generally enjoyed non-enforcement of their
covenants. Lower paid workers, 8 such as sales representatives and
hairdressers,3 7 who depend on commissions or tips for a substantial
undue hardship on the employee).
32. See, e.g., All Stainless, Inc. v. Colby, 364 Mass. 773, 308 N.E.2d 481 (1974); Na-
tional Homes Corp. v. Lester Indus. Inc., 293 F. Supp. 1025 (W. D. Va.), aff'd, 404 F.2d 225
(4th Cir. 1968); Reddy v. Community Health Found., 298 S.E.2d 906 (W. Va. 1982); Streiff
v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 118 Wis. 2d 602, 348 N.W.2d 505 (1984). See also 6A A.L.
CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1394 (1984).
33. 465 Pa. 586, 351 A.2d 250 (1976).
34. Id. at 591, 351 A.2d at 252. See also John G. Bryant Co. v. Sling Testing & Repair,
Inc., 471 Pa. 1, 369 A.2d 1164 (1977); Girard Inv. v. Bello, 456 Pa. 220, 318 A.2d 718 (1974);
Bettinger v. Carl Berke Assoc., Inc., 455 Pa. 100, 314 A.2d. 296 (1974); Jacobson & Co. v.
International Equip. Corp., 427 Pa. 439, 235 A.2d 612 (1967).
35. See infra notes 75-123 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 39-74 and accompanying text.
37. Beauticians have not fared well in the few reported Pennsylvania cases concerning
their noncompete employment covenants. In Seligman & Latz of Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Vernillo,
382 Pa. 161, 114 A.2d 672 (1955), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the lower
court's grant of a preliminary injunction, enjoining the defendants from operating a beauty
salon in competition with their former employer in violation of their restrictive covenants.
The defendants, two beauticians who had worked for the plaintiff employer, opened a com-
peting beauty salon virtually across the street from the plaintiff's establishment within ten
days of voluntarily terminating their employment. They also began to solicit the plaintiff's
customers. Both of these acts were prohibited by the defendants' employment contracts for
a period of one year after termination of employment. The supreme court held that restric-
tive covenants in employment contracts were valid unless the employee could prove that the
contract constituted an unreasonable or illegal restraint of trade. Id. at 164, 114 A.2d at 673.
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proportion of their incomes have frequently been subjected to
injunctions."8
Furthermore, the court affirmed its position that the scope of review regarding a grant or
denial of a preliminary injunction should be limited to a determination as to whether there
had been any "apparently reasonable grounds" for the action of the court below. Id. at 164,
114 A.2d at 674. The contract in the case before it, the court decided, did not constitute an
illegal restraint of trade, since the number of the plaintiff's customers was extremely small
and rendered the prohibition against soliciting such customers the equivalent of a limitation
to a reasonable geographical area. Id. at 166, 114 A.2d at 674-75.
Approximately ten years later, in Pankas v. Bell, 413 Pa. 494, 198 A.2d 312 (1964), the
supreme court again enforced a covenant not to compete in a hairdresser's employment con-
tract. Bell, a minor at the time, had agreed that if he should leave Pankas' employ he would
not engage in the hairstyling business, whether as employer or employee, within a ten-mile
radius of downtown Pittsburgh for a period of two years. The court held these restrictions to
be reasonable. Id. at 495-97, 198 A.2d at 312-13. With respect to the remaining issue of the
defendant's capacity, it was held that, while a minor's employmept contract is voidable, he
should not be permitted to utilize any benefits, training, or knowledge derived from such
contract to the detriment of his former employer. The court considered this rule necessary
to encourage the employment of minors. Id. at 501-02, 198 A.2d at 315.
Did the court in these cases have an accurate sense of the geographical market for this
service? If the hairdresser had worked nine miles from downtown Pittsburgh immediately
after leaving his job, for example, would that have damaged the former employer? Do the
customers of a downtown beauty salon travel ten miles to follow a particular hairdresser?
In Histand v. Nagorski, 37 D. & C.2d 157 (1964), however, the court of common pleas was
more sensitive to the dilemma of a barber who had signed a ten-year, five-mile noncompete
agreement. The court distinguished the restriction in Seligman, holding that the ten-year
restriction was unreasonable. The court held further that the offending contract provisions
were indivisible and that neither an injunction nor damages were, therefore, available. Id. at
177.
38. In order to validly grant a preliminary injunction a chancellor in equity must have
reasonable grounds upon which to make all three of the following findings: 1) There is an
urgent necessity to avoid an injury which would not be compensable by damages. 2) The
plaintiff is clearly entitled to relief on the merits of the case. 3) Greater injury would be
don e by refusing to grant the injunction than by granting it. E.g. Herman v. Dixon, 393 Pa.
33, 141 A.2d 576 (1958).
The preliminary injunction has been particularly troublesome for employees bound by
employee covenants not to compete. As noted by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Her-
man v. Dixon:
Since a preliminary injunction is somewhat like a judgment and execution before
trial, it will only issue where there is an urgent necessity to avoid injury which cannot
be compensated for by damages and should never be awarded except when the rights
of the plaintiff are clear. Also, it should in no event ever be issued unless greater
injury will be done by refusing it than by granting it.
393 Pa. at 36-37, 141 A.2d at 577.
Appellate review of the issuance or denial of preliminary injunctions is restricted by the
reasonable grounds rule which states that a lower court's grant or denial of a preliminary
injunction will not be overturned so long as there existed some reasonable grounds for the
chancellor's decision. This is an extremely narrow scope of review.
Because the Pennsylvania courts have often not been sympathetic to an employee's argu-
ment at the preliminary hearing that his employment restrictions were unreasonable, many
such noncompete agreements have been enforced without a thorough review of the merits of
the employee's claim that the noncompete covenants constituted an undue hardship. If the
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 24:777
SALES REPRESENTATIVES
The most common approach of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
regarding sales representatives has been to enforce the contract re-
strictions. This has been so even when the geographical area in
which the former employee was prohibited from competing was
broader than was necessary to protect the former employer. Under
such circumstances, the court has merely rewritten the restrictions
in order to make them reasonable.3 9
In Morgan's Home Equipment Corporation v. Martucci,40 door-
to-door salesmen of household articles were contractually prohib-
ited from competing with their former employer within 100 miles
of the city of Philadelphia. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in
this 1957 case, showed a high level of sensitivity to the employ-
ment difficulties that would be presented by such a broad geo-
graphic restriction. They reasoned as follows:
An employee is prevented [by a restrictive covenant] from practicing his
trade or skill, or from utilizing his experience in the particular type of work
with which he is familiar. He may encounter difficulty in transferring his
particular experience and training to another line of work, and hence his
ability to earn a living is seriously impaired. Further, the employee will usu-
ally have few resources in reserve to fall back upon, and he may find it
difficult to uproot himself and his family in order to move to a location
beyond the area of potential competition with his former employer.
4 1
The court held that the 100 mile restriction on competition im-
posed upon the door-to-door salesmen was not reasonably neces-
sary for the protection of the employer and that it constituted an
lower courts had consistently heeded the supreme court's cautionary language in Herman v.
Dixon regarding preliminary injunctions, many of these cases might have had a result more
favorable to the employee.
39. See John G. Bryant Co. v. Sling Testing & Repair, Inc., 471 Pa. 1, 369 A.2d 1164
(1977); Boldt Mach. & Tools, Inc. v. Wallace, 469 Pa. 504, 366 A.2d 902 (1976); Sidco Paper
Co. v. Aaron, 465 Pa. 586, 351 A.2d 250 (1976); Bettinger v. Carl Berke Assoc., Inc., 455 Pa.
100, 314 A.2d 296 (1974); Jacobson & Co. v. International Equip. Corp., 427 Pa. 439, 235
A.2d 612 (1967); Albee Homes, Inc. v. Caddie Homes, Inc., 417 Pa. 177, 207 A.2d 768 (1965).
For similar lower court modifications, see Gordon Wahs Co. v. Linde, 306 Pa. Super. 64, 452
A.2d 4 (1982)(executive finding agency's employee's one-year, twenty-one state covenant not
to compete enforced but injunction modified as overbroad); Harry Blackwood, Inc. v.
Caputo, 290 Pa. Super. 140, 434 A.2d 169 (1981)(insurance agent's covenant not to call on
firm's clients for five years reduced to three years based on testimony regarding the insur-
ance agency's business); Janitor Jim, Inc. v. Munson, 32 Pa. D. & C.3d 276 (1983)(injunction
issued to enforce covenant not to compete for three years in several counties signed by for-
mer salesman/manager in charge of soliciting customers for janitorial services firm).
40. 390 Pa. 618, 136 A.2d 838 (1957).
41. Id. at 632, 136 A.2d at 846.
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undue hardship upon the employee.42 Therefore, the court ruled
that the covenant could not be enforced without modification. The
court did, however, prohibit the defendants from continuing to so-
licit the existing customers of their former employer 43 and ordered
them to account for sales already made to such customers." This
was done because the defendants' solicitation of their former em-
ployer's customers was perceived by the court to be equivalent to
the taking of trade secrets.45 The injunction and accounting were
not granted as a result of the breach of contract, but rather in view
of the tortious acts of misappropriation and use of a trade secret."6
The court, however, adopted a different approach in Pennsylva-
nia Funds Corporation v. Vogel. 7 The county court had enjoined
the defendant securities salesman only from selling to his former
employer's customers or prospective customers. On appeal, the su-
preme court remanded the case to enlarge the injunction to cover
the entire state of Pennsylvania as provided by the contract.4 The
court distinguished Morgan's Home Equipment from Pennsylva-
nia Funds on the grounds that the securities salesmen of Pennsyl-
vania Funds Corporation were given extensive training by their
employer.49 Furthermore, the court pointed out that the defendant
in Pennsylvania Funds had opened his own competing business
and had enticed fourteen other employees to join him.50 The court
also noted that the defendants' firm could sell life insurance and
accounting services as an alternative source of employment. 51 In
Morgan's Home Equipment, by contrast, the employees had re-
42. Id. at 632-33, 136 A.2d at 846-47.
43. Id. at 633, 136 A.2d at 847.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 623-25, 136 A.2d at 842.
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 757 comment b. This comment defines a trade
secret as follows:A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of
information which is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain
an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it. It may be a formula for a chemi-
cal compound, a process of manufacturing, treating or preserving materials, a pattern for a
machine or other device, or a list of customers.
Id. The Pennsylvania courts have adopted this definition. See, e.g., Van Products Co. v.
General Welding and Fabricating Co., 419 Pa. 248, 213 A.2d 769 (1965); West Mountain
Poultry Co. v. Gress, 309 Pa. Super. 361, 455 A.2d 651 (1982). For a comprehensive listing of
the other jurisdictions that have adopted the Restatement definition of a trade secret, see 12
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, R.M. MILGRIM, TRADE SECRETS § 2.01 (1982).
47. 399 Pa. 1, 159 A.2d 472 (1960).
48. Id. at 9, 159 A.2d at 476.
49. Id. at 7-8, 159 A.2d at 475-76.
50. Id at 8, 159 A.2d at 476.
51. Id. at 9, 159 A.2d at 476.
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ceived no special training from their employer, 5 went to work for
another,53 and would have been prevented from earning a liveli-
hood if not permitted to compete with the former employer.54 In
sum, the court indicated that there would be no hardship if the
covenant were enforced, but that in Morgan's Home Equipment
there would have been hardship.55
In Albee Homes Inc. v. Caddie Homes, Inc.," injunctions were
issued against the corporate defendant and two individual defend-
ants. 57 The individual defendants had been showroom salesmen of
prefabricated houses for the plaintiff. Their contracts restricted
them from competing with the plaintiff "within a radius of 50
miles of any sales office of Albee Homes, Inc."' "5 The court limited
the restriction to fifty miles from the location at which the employ-
ees had actually worked.59 There was "a direct and reasonable con-
nection," the court reasoned, between the covenant and the protec-
tion of the former employer's business. No further justification was
given to support this view. There was no inquiry into the nature
and size of the employer's market.60 It is doubtful that it was fifty
miles wide. Nor was there an inquiry into the issues raised in
Pennsylvania Funds and Morgan's Home Equipment, such as
whether the employee received training from the employer,
whether he had alternative skills and whether he would be pre-
vented, by the enforcement of the restriction, from earning a
livelihood.
In five other cases, restrictive covenants have been enforced by
the court only as to the service areas that salesmen have actually
covered even though their contracts provided for heavier restric-
tions."1 In another case, Plunkett Chemical Co. v. Reeve,62 the con-
52. Id. at 7, 159 A.2d at 475; Morgan's Home Equip., 390 Pa. at 632, 136 A.2d at 846.
53. Pennsylvania Funds Corp., 399 Pa. at 8, 159 A.2d at 476; Morgan's Home Equip.,
390 Pa. at 621, 136 A.2d at 841.
54. Pennsylvania Funds Corp., 399 Pa. at 9, 159 A.2d at 476.
55. Id. at 8-9, 159 A.2d at 476.
56. 417 Pa. 177, 207 A.2d 768 (1965).
57. Id. at 180-81, 207 A.2d at 770.
58. Id. at 184, 207 A.2d at 772.
59. Id. at 185-86, 207 A.2d at 773.
60. Id. at 186, 207 A.2d at 773.
61. John G. Bryant Co. v. Sling Testing & Repair, Inc., 471 Pa. 1, 369 A.2d 1164
(1977); Boldt Mach. & Tools, Inc. v. Wallace, 469 Pa. 504, 366 A.2d.902 (1976); Sidco Paper
Co. v. Aaron, 465 Pa. 586, 351 A.2d 250 (1976); Bettinger v. Carl Berke Assoc., Inc., 455 Pa.
100, 314 A.2d 296 (1974); Jacobson & Co. v. International Env't Corp., 427 Pa. 439, 235 A.2d
612 (1967).
62. 373 Pa. 513, 95 A.2d 925 (1953).
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tract was upheld even though it lacked an area term altogether.
The court simply added an area limitation corresponding to the
employee's sales territory.63
The employee in John G. Bryant Co. v. Sling Testing and Re-
pair," had promised in his employment agreement not to sell to
any of 560 established customer accounts of his employer.6 5 The
former employee contended, however, that "some of the corporate
customers are so large that the effective area of restriction spans
the entire nation."6 The court simply affirmed the lower court's
ruling that the area of restriction should be limited to the com-
pany's service area, which included Delaware, eastern Pennsylva-
nia and southern New Jersey. 7 The former employee was enjoined
from selling to the employer's customers in that particular geo-
graphical region, but was free to sell to the same customers any-
where else in the world. This result was more equitable than most
Pennsylvania decisions involving salesmen. It enabled the ex-em-
ployee to choose to either continue to work in the same geographi-
cal area as he had been working or to sell to the same companies
but in another region. This preserves the worker's mobility without
allowing any harm to come to the employer's business.
Both the geographical and time restrictions were arguably too
broad in Boldt Machinery & Tools, Inc. v. Wallace.6 8 The employ-
ment contract contained a five-year restriction on sales by the em-
ployee in the employer's territory, which covered western Pennsyl-
vania, southwestern New York and Ohio. The employee had been
assigned to a sales territory comprised of only portions of north-
western Pennsylvania and southwestern New York.
The time restriction issue was the more complex of the two is-
sues. In an effort to resolve this issue, the court quoted the famous
63. Id. at 516-17, 95 A.2d at 927.
64. 471 Pa. 1, 369 A.2d 1164 (1977).
65. Id. at 11, 369 A.2d at 1169. Under most circumstances, inserting a restriction based
on the established customer base rather than an arbitrary geographical limitation seems to
be the ideal way to draft such agreements, because the relationship between the covenant
and the protection of the employer is made clear: the employee is not permitted to interfere
with the employer's established accounts.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 11-12, 369 A.2d at 1169. The court noted that the appellant had presented
no evidence that he was unable to establish a business without being able to sell directly to
the specified companies and, therefore, he had not met his burden of proving the unreasona-
bleness of the restraint. Id. at 12-13, 369 A.2d at 1170. The court interpreted the present
noncompete agreement by reference to two prior noncompete agreements between the par-
ties. Id. at 11-12, 369 A.2d at 1169.
68. 469 Pa. 504, 366 A.2d 902 (1976).
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Harvard Law Review article by Professor Harlan Blake as follows:
In determining whether a restraint extends for a longer period of time than
necessary to protect the employer, the court must determine how much
time is needed for the risk of injury to be reasonably moderated. When the
restraint is for the purpose of protecting customer relationships, its dura-
tion is reasonable only if it is no longer than necessary for the employer to
put a new man on the job and for the new employee to have a reasonable
opportunity to demonstrate his effectiveness to the customers. If the selling
or servicing relationship is relatively complex, a longer period may be called
for. Courts seldom criticize restraints of six months or a year on the grounds
of duration as such, and even longer restraints are often enforced. 9
Under this analysis, the five-year limitation would seem patently
unreasonable, since Blake speaks only in terms of the time it takes
for a new sales representative to establish a rapport with the cus-
tomers. He also specifically suggests six months to a year as a rea-
sonable time period within which to accomplish that goal. Further-
more, even that test is not applied unless there is some necessity to
protect the employer from injury. Blake's article is also quoted by
the Boldt court later in the case, in an effort to further explain the
restraint of salesperson-customer relationships: "Frequency of con-
tact may also control or affect the permissible period of the re-
straint. Paradoxically, if the contract is less frequent a longer pe-
riod of restraint may be reasonable. 1 70 After reading the record of
testimony from the employer to the effect that some customers
were called upon no more than once every six months, and that the
products being sold were relatively complex, the Boldt court al-
lo, ed the five-year restriction to stand.7
Is it ever fair that an employer should be permitted to prevent a
former employee from working in a large region covering parts of
two states for a period of five full years? It is difficult to believe
that Boldt Machinery needed to be free of its former employee's
69. Id. at 513-14, 366 A.2d at 907, citing Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Com-
pete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625, 677-78 (1960).
70. Boldt Machinery, 469 Pa. at 514, 366 A.2d at 907, citing Blake, supra note 69, at
659.
71. Boldt Machinery, 469 Pa. at 575, 366 A.2d at 908. The trial court decree as to
duration was left undisturbed because there was no majority opinion as to the proper dispo-
sition of the issue: three judges would have enforced it; two would have held it unenforce-
able; and one would have modified it. Justice Pomeroy, writing for those who would have
enforced the restraint, noted that "[w]hile a five-year anti-competitive covenant in a con-
tract of employment either approaches or exceeds the bounds of reasonableness ... [and]
[w]hile we would have preferred the period to be shorter, we cannot on this record declare




competition in his former sales territory for such a lengthy period
of time. Even if some customers were only called upon every six
months, it does not follow that such a long interval between sales
calls is necessary or even desirable for a business. What would pre-
clude the employer's new sales representative from immediately
calling upon all established customers to assure that they would
continue to purchase from that company? Such action would re-
present a prudent counter-strategy for a company faced with com-
petition from any source, whether from a former employee or from
some other competitor.
A final case which is of interest is Bettinger v. Carl Berke Asso-
ciates,7 2 where the court granted an injunction against a former
sales employee even though his employment contract did not pro-
vide for injunctive relief for breach of his covenant not to compete.
The fact that the contract specifically mentioned damages as the
remedy for its breach did not warrant a conclusion, as far as the
court was concerned, that damages should be the exclusive rem-
edy.73 In fact, the court concluded, protection of the former em-
ployer would not be accomplished by damages only.7" The court
failed to explain, however, why damages would be inadequate. It is
difficult to understand why the court would order a remedy more
harsh than the one provided for in the contract.
Sales representatives in Pennsylvania would be particularly well-
advised to consult with an attorney before entering into an em-
ployment contract with post-employment competition restrictions.
According to the more recent cases, such as Boldt and Bettinger,
any such agreement will be at least partially enforced in Pennsyl-
vania, even if it covers a geographical area as wide as several states
or the entire nation. If forced to litigate a noncompete agreement,
the best that the salesperson can hope for is that the court will
modify the contract so as to make it less burdensome and
restrictive.
72. 455 Pa. 100, 314 A.2d 296 (1974).
73. Id. at 105, 314 A.2d at 298.
74. Id., 314 A.2d at 299. The court did not specifically state the reason for finding that
the remedy could not be limited to damages. However, the explanation is implicit in their
rationale for allowing the injunction to stand. The court found that a provider of temporary
help, in order to retain his customers, must develop a close personal relationship with them
by visiting them on a regular basis. Id. at 104-05, 314 A.2d at 298. The former employee in
this case had established this rapport with the appellant's clients, and if he were not pre-
vented from continuing to visit these companies, they would likely begin to obtain their
temporary services from him. Id.
1986
Duquesne Law Review
PHYSICIANS AND OTHER MEDICAL PROFESSIONALS
When the signers of restrictive covenants have been physicians,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has shown more reluctance to en-
force the covenants. A typical example of this restrained approach
is the case of Herman v. Dixon.71 Dixon, a gynecologist, had agreed
as a condition of employment that upon termination of his em-
ployment, he would not engage in the practice of medicine within
fifteen miles of the city of Pottsville for a period of three years.
Less than three months after beginning to work for the plaintiff
employer, however, he severed the relationship and opened his own
office in Pottsville. The county court granted a preliminary injunc-
tion, but the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed.7
The court noted in passing that its scope of review was severely
limited by the reasonable grounds rule, which states that a lower
court's grant or denial of a preliminary injunction will not be over-
turned as long as there existed some reasonable grounds for the
chancellor's decision." In fact, the court likened the issuance of a
preliminary injunction to a judgment and execution before trial.
Therefore, the justices maintained, preliminary injunctions should
not be granted imprudently. According to the court, the record
contained no evidence of damage actually suffered by the plaintiff
or of urgent necessity to prevent irreparable harm.7 8 To the con-
trary, the justices reasoned that the injunction would have caused
defendant and his family to suffer greater injury since the defend-
ant was without sufficient financial resources to move his office
outside the proscribed area.
7 9
The decree of the lower court was reversed, and Dr. Dixon was
permitted to continue his practice in competition with his former
employer. The court bypassed the usual inquiry into the reasona-
bleness of the restrictions. The reversal was made on the grounds
that a preliminary injunction would not have been an appropriate
remedy.
The granting of an injunction only where it will prevent greater
harm than the refusal to grant one is a sound and well established
75. 393 Pa. 33, 141 A.2d 576 (1958).
76. Id. at 38, 141 A.2d at 578.
77. Id. at 36, 141 A.2d at 577. See supra note 38.
78. 393 Pa. at 38, 141 A.2d at 578.
79. Id. See also Madany v. Lee, 5 Pa. D. & C.3d 108 (1978) (preliminary injunction
denied; covenant which precluded the defendant's practice within fifteen miles of the only
two hospitals in the area created undue burden on defendant and bore no reasonable rela-
tion to the plaintiff's protectable interests).
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judicial practice. Damages are, after all, the ordinary remedy for
breach of contract. Reasoning similar to that employed in Dixon
should be widely applied. The courts should routinely inquire as to
whether the plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm if an injunction is
not granted.
In the 1967 case of Hayes v. Altman,"0 a restrictive covenant was
enforced against Dr. Altman, an optometrist who had agreed not to
practice optometry in the borough of Monroeville or elsewhere
within a radius of six air miles of his employer's office for a period
of three years from the termination of employment.8 Upon com-
pletion of his five-year employment contract, Altman was dis-
charged by his employer for having failed to sign a new agreement.
About one month later, Altman opened his own practice in
Monroeville.
82
The chancellor had refused to enforce the covenant, stating that
the covenant not to compete was not reasonably necessary for the
protection of the former employer and that its enforcement would
constitute an undue hardship upon the defendant.83 The standard
regarding the employer's need for protection from competition
had, of course, been incorporated into the law of Pennsylvania by
this time in Morgan's Home Equipment.
8 4
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed, however, stating
that the contract was enforceable as it was reasonable as to time
and geographical extent and did not impose undue hardship upon
the former employee. 85 Employment contracts containing cove-
nants not to compete after the termination of employment are
prima facie enforceable, it stated, if they are reasonably limited as
to duration of time and geographical extent. The court explained
that covenants would be found to be reasonably limited if their
territory and time restrictions were reasonably necessary for the
protection of the employer, without imposing undue hardship on
the employee. 86
80. 424 Pa. 23, 225 A.2d 670 (1967).
81. Id. at 25, 225 A.2d at 671.
82. Id. at 26, 225 A.2d at 671.
83. Id.
84. 390 Pa. 618, 136 A.2d 838 (1957). See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
85. 424 Pa. at 29, 225 A.2d at 673.
86. Id. at 28-29, 225 A.2d at 672. The court was not reviewing the grant or refusal of a
preliminary injunction and its scope of review was not limited by the reasonable grounds
rule. It looked to Seligman & Latz of Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Vernillo, 382 Pa. 161, 114 A.2d 672
(1955) and Morgan's Home Equip. Corp. v. Martucci, 390 Pa. 618, 136 A.2d 838 (1957), for
controlling precedent, see supra notes 37, 40-46 and accompanying text. See also Hop-
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The opinion of the court in Hayes v. Altman was handed down
nearly three years after the termination of Altman's employment.
When Hayes applied to the county court for specific performance,
Altman argued that three years from the date of termination had
expired and that the restriction would therefore be unenforceable.
The chancellor agreed and the supreme court affirmed. Although
the contract restrictions were held to be valid, they were never en-
forced and Altman practiced in the restricted area without
interruption.
The most recent case regarding a restrictive covenant in an em-
ployment contract of a medical professional to reach Pennsylva-
nia's highest court is New Castle Orthopedic Associates v. Burns,8
7
in which a physician, specializing in orthopedics, had agreed that
he would not practice medicine in Lawrence County, Pennsylvania,
for a two-year period after the termination of his employment.
When the physician opened his own office in Lawrence County im-
mediately following his resignation, his former employer filed suit
against him. A preliminary injunction was granted against the phy-
sician and the superior court affirmed per curiam without opinion.
The supreme court however, reversed.
8 8
In its opinion, the state supreme court first quoted verbatim the
stern rationale of Herman v. Dixon regarding the seriousness of
the issuance of a preliminary injunction and its likeness to a judg-
ment and execution before trial.8 9 It then set forth a slightly re-
vised version of that rule, stating that the essential prerequisites
for the issuance of a preliminary injunction were as follows:
[F]irst, that it is necessary to prevent immediate and irreparable harm
which could not be compensated by damages; second, that greater injury
would result by refusing it than by granting it; and third, that it properly
penwasser v. Press-Lipkowitz Dental Assocs., 5 Pa. D. & C.3d 551 (1978) (declaratory judg-
ment action; court enforced covenant reasoning that the practice of dentistry was a business
as well as a profession and therefore gave rise to protectable goodwill interests).
The opinion of the court in Hayes v. Altman was handed down nearly three years after
the termination of Altman's employment. When Hayes applied to the county court for spe-
cific performance, Altman raised the defense that the court no longer had the power to
compel specific performance, as the time for performance, i.e., three years from the date of
termination, had passed. The supreme court affirmed the chancellor's refusal to grant an
injunction, holding that employee noncompete agreements were no longer enforceable when
the original time period restriction had expired: Hayes v. Altman, 438 Pa. 451, 455, 266 A.2d
269, 271 (1970). See also Davis v. Buckham, 280 Pa. Super. 106, 421 A.2d 427 (1980).
87. 481 Pa. 460, 392 A.2d 1383 (1978) (Eagen & Larsen, J.J., concurring) (Roberts &
O'Brien, J.J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 462-63, 392 A.2d at 1384.
89. Id. at 463, 392 A.2d at 1384. See supra notes 38, 75-79 and accompanying text.
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restores the parties to their status as it existed immediately prior to the
alleged wrongful conduct.2
The court found that greater harm would result from the issu-
ance than from the denial of an injunction and that the plaintiff
had failed to establish immediate and irreparable injury that could
not be compensated in damages." This conclusion, the court main-
tained was supported by the lack of any evidence in the record of
economic injury to the plaintiff, such as a decrease in the number
of patients or solicitation by the defendant of plaintiff's patients.92
Notice that this is the first case in which even a plurality of the
justices observed that perhaps the employer's injury was some-
thing that was observable and quantifiable, requiring that evidence
of the injury be submitted. Prior to this time, injury had simply
been presumed. Additionally, the court considered important testi-
mony that showed that patients had to wait as long as four months
for an appointment with the plaintiff's physicians and that there
was a shortage of orthopedists in Lawrence County.9 The plaintiff,
the court concluded, "was attempting to serve more patients than
it could possibly accommodate. ' 94 Perhaps observations of a simi-
lar nature could have been made in other restrictive covenant
cases.
The court, in New Castle, added to the list of factors that must
be considered in restrictive covenant cases another that was never
previously mentioned: the interests of society as a whole.95 Citing
cases from other jurisdictions involving neurosurgeons, radiologists
and other physicians, it noted that courts of other states had often
looked to whether or not there had been a shortage of medical
practitioners in the area in order to decide whether society's inter-
ests would have been poorly served by the granting of an injunc-
tion. 6 As the court noted:
90. 481 Pa. at 464, 392 A.2d at 1385 (quoting John G. Bryant Co. v. Sling Testing &
Repair, Inc., 471 Pa. 1, 369 A.2d 1164 (1977)).
91. Id. at 465, 392 A.2d at 1385-86.
92. Id. at 466, 392 A.2d at 1383.
93. Id. at 467, 392 A.2d at 1387.
94. Id. at 467-68, 392 A.2d at 1387.
95. Id. at 468, 392 A.2d at 1387.
96. Id. at 468-69, 392 A.2d at 1387. In Nagaraj v. Arcilla, 20 Pa. D. & C.3d 574 (1981),
the court issued a preliminary injunction to enjoin the defendant doctor from violating his
covenant not to compete with his former employer. The court looked first to the New Castle
public policy considerations, but determined that an injunction would have no adverse ef-
fects on the community because there were approximately one hundred doctors in a ten
mile radius of the plaintiff doctor's family clinic. Id. at 586. Furthermore, the court found
substantial evidence of great injury to the plaintiff combined with surreptitious dealings by
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Paramount to the respective rights of the parties to the covenant, must be
its effect upon the consumer who is in need of the service. This is of partic-
ular significance where equitable relief is being sought and the result of such
an order or decree would deprive the community involved of a desperately
needed service.
9 7
This society-oriented approach does not appear in any other em-
ployee anti-competition case in Pennsylvania. The court does not
indicate, however, whether this principle should be applied only to
doctors or also to other types of employees whose services might be
equally necessary to the functioning of society.
EXECUTIVES AND OTHER BUSINESS PROFESSIONALS
There are four Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions dealing
with restrictive covenants involving executives and upper level
business employees." In each case, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court denied enforcement.
In Reading Aviation Service, Inc. v. Bertolet,"9 the employee,
Bertolet, was president and chairman of the board of the plaintiff
corporation. He had agreed that he would not own an interest in or
engage in or assist any business that was competitive with his em-
ployer's, in the event that he should voluntarily discontinue the
employment relationship. Bertolet later resigned and helped to or-
ganize a competing company located some 600 feet away from the
plaintiff's place of business. The state supreme court affirmed the
county court's denial of enforcement, stating that the promise was
void on its face because it lacked limitations on either time or
space, 10 0 and that such limitations would not be added by the court
to allow enforcement.
101
This decision is not consistent with the cases of salesmen and
hairdressers. In many of the contracts of salesmen, the court sim-
ply rewrote overly broad restrictions in order to make them rea-
the defendant doctor who opened a competing family clinic around the corner while still in
the plaintiff's employ. Id. at 583-84. Nagaraj, therefore, is factually distinguishable from
New Castle, and it is probable that public policy considerations will continue to be determi-
native in most future suits to enforce covenants not to compete signed by medical doctors.
97. 481 Pa. at 469, 392 A.2d at 1387-88.
98. Fox-Morris Assocs., Inc. v. Conroy, 460 Pa. 290, 333 A.2d 732 (1975); Girard -Inv.
Co. v. Bello, 456 Pa. 220, 318 A.2d 718 (1974); Trilog Assocs., Inc. v. Famularo, 455 Pa. 243,
314 A.2d 287 (1974); and Reading Aviation Serv., Inc. v. Bertolet, 454 Pa. 488, 311 A.2d 628
(1973).
99. 454 Pa. 488, 311 A.2d 628 (1973).
100. Id. at 491, 311 A.2d at 630.
101. Id. at 492-93, 311 A.2d at 630.
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sonable. 102 In Bertolet, the employer was likely to be injured by
the competition of its former employee since this was not an ordi-
nary employee but rather the president and chairman of the board.
The court, however, did not take notice of this fact and the cove-
nant was neither enforced nor rewritten.
Furthermore, it is likely that competition at a distance of 600
feet from the former employer's place of business would be highly
injurious to the former employer if the market for aviation services
were at all geographically determined. This would probably be the
case, aviation being a transportation enterprise. In Plunkett, a
salesman case discussed previously, the court had found an implied
area term in a contract that lacked an express area restriction.'03
The same would have been done in this case if there were cross-
occupational consistency. Instead, enforcement was totally denied.
Additionally, given the standards articulated by Professor Blake,
even a time restriction could have been determined by the Bertolet
court. The test would be the amount of time needed for the risk of
injury to the previous employer to be reasonably moderated.
Blake's suggestion that six month to one year restrictions are al-
most always reasonable'0 might also have been utilized here.
It is strange that, in Pankas0 5 a minor hairdresser was prohib-
ited from working within ten miles of his former workplace for two
years simply because his contract so provided, but a president and
chairman of the board of an aviation company could not be pre-
vented from working 600 feet away from his former place of em-
ployment for even one day. Which form of competition would have
been more injurious to the former employer? Surely the latter. A
president and chairman of the board is in a position to do harm to
the former employer by revealing trade secrets or inside informa-
tion. Surely a hairdresser has no comparable capabilities. The
maximum harm that a hairdresser could do would be to use his or
102. See supra notes 37, 39-74 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text. In Bertolet, the court concluded
that the agreement not to compete was an "open-ended restriction" which imposed "an
unconscionable burden on [Bertolet's] ability to pursue his chosen profession." The agree-
ment was struck down as void on its face due to the lack of a limitation as to time and
space, a deficiency regarded by the court as beyond the bounds of reasonableness. Citing the
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS, section 518, the Bertolet court held that the promise
was indivisible and hence unenforceable. It distinguished several earlier cases, including
Plunkett (which contained a one-year time limitation), as examples of "more narrowly
drawn agreements." 454 Pa. at 492-93, 311 A.2d at 630.
104. Blake, supra note 69, at 677-78.
105. Pankas v. Bell, 413 Pa. 494, 198 A.2d 312 (1964); see supra note 37.
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her personal skill and charisma to lure away patrons whose hair
has been styled by the same hairdresser at the former place of
employment.
All of this is not to argue that the court should have added its
own time and area restrictions in order to enforce the Bertolet con-
tract. Rather, it is to show that the precedent and standards ex-
isted, so that the court could have done so in the interests of con-
sistency, had it wished. The superior approach, however, is not to
redraft a contract for an employer (or for an employee for that
matter) but instead simply to deny enforcement of any unfair or
oppressive clause or clauses.
In Trilog Associates, Inc. v. Famularo,'06 the cases of three for-
mer employees of Trilog, a data processing firm, were consolidated.
Famularo and Marabella had resigned from their positions with
Trilog and had formed their own competing business. They hired
Gawrys, who had been fired from Trilog, and the three began to
perform data processing services for a former client of Trilog.
10 7
Famularo had agreed with his former employer that he would
not develop or assist in the development or exploitation of any
shareholders' record system on his own account or for any other
party. Marabella and Gawrys had agreed that they would not enter
the employ of any customer or client of Trilog for a period of two
years after leaving the employ of Trilog. a08
Although the chancellor in equity had granted an injunction
against the defendants, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the non-competition clauses in all three contracts
were void.109 In doing so, the court cited section 516(f) of the Re-
statement (First) of Contracts, 1 stating that the restrictions upon
the defendants were greater than required for the protection of the
former employer, and that they constituted an undue hardship
upon the former employees.'11
106. 455 Pa. 243, 314 A.2d 287 (1974).
107. Id. at 245, 314 A.2d at 289.
108. Id. at 248, 253-54, 314 A.2d at 291, 293.
109. Id. at 254, 314 A.2d at 293.
110. RESTATEMENT (FiRsT) OF CONTRACTS, section 516 provides for.several forms of
bargains that do not, unless effecting or forming part of a plan to effect a monopoly, impose
unreasonable restraints of trade. Subsection (f) includes:A bargain by an assistant, servant,
or agent not to compete with his employer, or principal, during the term of the employment
or agency, or thereafter, within such territory and during such time as may be reasonably
necessary for the protection of the employer or principal, without imposing undue hardship
on the employee or agent.
Id.
111. 455 Pa. at 254, 314 A.2d at 293-94.
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The court found that the restrictions were broader than those
necessary for the former employer's protection in view of the lack
of a limitation on territory. As Justice Manderino commented on
behalf of six members of the court:
Famularo in effect promised not to practice his profession anywhere for
anyone in developing a shareholders' record system. His promise is similar
to a covenant by an attorney not to try murder cases anywhere for anyone
because he gained experience in trying murder cases from his former em-
ployer, or a covenant by a bricklayer not to build an apartment house any-
where for anyone because his former employer gave him his first opportu-
nity to use his bricklaying talent in building an apartment house. Such
covenants, unrestricted in territorial application, are not necessary to pro-




Similarly, the court noted, Marabella and Gawrys would have been
unable to work for any client of Trilog, anywhere and in any ca-
pacity whatsoever, even if totally unrelated to the work which they
had performed for Trilog, if their restrictions had been enforced. 113
It is a bit peculiar to see territorial restrictions occupying such a
sacrosanct position. A restriction on the development of sharehold-
ers' records systems is comparatively narrow and carefully circum-
scribed. Famularo was free to perform any other type of data
processing service with no time or territorial restrictions.
Marabella and Gawrys were free to do anything at all, anywhere
they liked, as long as they did not do it for any client of Trilog.
These, too, are restrictions that could hardly be regarded as op-
pressive when compared to some others that have been enforced.
In fact, an employee, if given a choice of various post-employment
restrictions would probably select the types of restrictions imposed
on Famularo, Marabella and Gawrys. Restrictions on the type of
project or client do not force the employee to stay out of work for
any period of time or to relocate. Time and area restrictions, on
the other hand, usually create such hardships.
In Girard Investment Co. v. Bello,114 the defendant had been
employed as the manager of a branch office of a consumer finance
company. After having been transferred by his employer to a new,
less desirable branch office against his will, he resigned from the
plaintiff company and established his own concern with himself as
president. The defendant's new business was within the plaintiff's
112. Id. at 254-55, 314 A.2d at 294 (emphasis in original).
113. Id. at 255-56, 314 A.2d at 294.
114. 456 Pa. 220, 318 A.2d 718 (1974).
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"trade territory," four or five miles from the plaintiff's Logan
Square branch office in Norristown where the defendant had
worked when originally hired by the plaintiff. The defendant had
covenanted as follows:
That for a period of one year after the termination of my employment for
any reason I will not engage in any way, directly or indirectly, in any busi-
ness competitive with the Employer's business, nor solicit or in any other
way or manner work for or assist any competitive business, in any city or
the environs or trade territory thereof in which I shall have been located or
employed within one year prior to such termination."' l
The chancellor in equity had held that the restriction was not
reasonably necessary for the protection of the former employer and
that it was an undue hardship on the former employee because it
had overly broad geographic limitations.116 The Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court affirmed with very little explanation, except to say
that the restrictions were in fact not reasonably necessary and
that, in order to have been construed otherwise the employee
would have had to have received special training or have learned
guarded methods or trade secrets in the course of his employment
with the plaintiff.1 7 The court concluded that those factors were
absent, and that the covenants were therefore unenforceable. 8
The court treated this employee comparatively favorably, in
light of other decisions. The geographical area which would have
been off limits to the employee had the contract been enforced was
less than the size of one county. The court would not have hesi-
tated to enforce a contract restricting a sales representative from
competing in an area this small. In the cases involving salesmen,
the former employees merely went to work for competitors. In
Girard Investment Company, the defendant actually opened a
competing firm within a few miles of the former employer. The
court permitted him to do so, despite the terms of his contract.
Finally, in the case of Fox-Morris Associates, Inc. v. Conroy,""
115. 456 Pa. at 221-22, 318 A.2d at 719.
116. Id. at 222, 318 A.2d at 719.
117. Id. at 223-24, 318 A.2d at 720. The court in Girard Investment did not consider
the restrictions necessary to protect the employer from a loss of "carefully guarded methods
of doing business." 456 Pa. at 223, 318 A.2d at 720, quoting Morgan's Home Equip. Corp. v.
Martucci, 390 Pa. 618, 631, 136 A.2d 838, 846 (1957). In his dissenting opinion, Justice Pom-
eroy noted the testimony from both parties regarding the importance of personal contacts in
the consumer finance business and concluded that the restrictive covenant was necessary for
the protection of the employer. 456 Pa. at 226-27, 318 A.2d at 721 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 223-24, 318 A.2d at 720.
119. 460 Pa. 290, 333 A.2d 732 (1975).
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the state supreme court affirmed a lower court's refusal to grant an
injunction against an executive employment counselor.120 In addi-
tion to a restriction which provided that for eighteen months fol-
lowing termination of employment he would not compete within a
certain geographical area, the contract stipulated that the restric-
tions were necessary for the reasonable and proper protection of
the company's business, and also that in the event that the restric-
tions became operative, the employee would "be able to engage in
other businesses for the purposes of earning a livelihood." '121 Thus,
the employee was arguably waiving any defenses he might have
had to the effect that the restrictions were not reasonably neces-
sary or that their enforcement would work an undue hardship
upon him by causing him to suffer a period of unemployment. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's affirmance, however, did not men-
tion the issue of such a waiver. The court merely referred to the
limited scope of review of preliminary injunction requests, and
then stated the following:
The covenant in the instant case restricted appellees from engaging in a
competitive business within a one-hundred-mile radius . . .of any place
where appellant had offices. Under these circumstances, the enforcement of
the restrictive covenant and its implications are not susceptible to the dras-
tic action of a preliminary injunction. 2
The court did not mention or discuss the possibility of partial en-
forcement, by which they could have restricted Conroy from com-
peting within a one-hundred-mile radius of the office where he had
actually worked. Such a compromise would hardly have been un-
precedented in light of the cases dealing with sales represent-
atives.
12 3
120. Id. at 293, 333 A.2d at 734.
121. Id. at 292, 333 A.2d at 733.
122. Id. at 293, 333 A.2d at 734.
123. See supra notes 39-74 and accompanying text. In a concurring opinion, Justice
Roberts noted that courts of equity will enforce only those covenants not to compete which
are reasonably necessary for the protection of the employer. In comparison, where the cove-
nant imposes restrictions broader than necessary to protect the employer, enforcement in
equity will be limited to those portions of the restrictions necessary for the protection of the
employer (citing Jacobson & Co. v. International Env't Corp., 427 Pa. 439, 235 A.2d 612
(1967)). Justice Roberts concurred in the result, however, because he believed there were
"apparently reasonable grounds" for the chancellor's decision that the employer had failed
to show that irreparable harm would result from the denial of the injunction. 460 Pa. at 294-




This paper has dealt with some of the Pennsylvania cases which
illustrate what may well be a trend, albeit heretofore unarticulated,
toward deciding the enforceability of post-employment contract re-
strictions on competition according to the occupation of the cove-
nantor. Hairdressers and sales representatives have generally not
been permitted to operate in the trade areas of their former em-
ployers, whereas physicians, optometrists and executives have been
permitted to compete with their former employers despite cove-
nants to the contrary. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has spe-
cifically cited an undersupply of doctors in certain geographical ar-
eas as the reason for not enforcing restrictions against them. No
other appellate decision regarding restrictive covenants in Pennsyl-
vania has inquired openly into the supply of workers in the field in
question, even though such an inquiry might be helpful in deter-
mining the economic impact of such case decisions upon society.
Society should not be deprived of people with important or scarce
talents. Nor has there been sufficient inquiry into other economic
factors such as the market in which the employee worked and the
existence or non-existence of employer goodwill.
The courts are not necessarily the reason such matters have not
been considered. A review of the testimony presented in some of
these cases reveals that neither economists nor other experts were
used as witnesses. The need to enforce the contract restrictions is
typically measured only by the testimony of the employer. Em-
ployers ought to be held to a higher, more objective standard of
proof than merely their own opinions, or perhaps attorneys for for-
mer employees should engage the services of expert witnesses. Fur-
thermore, in the interest of fairness, courts should shift the burden
of proving that the restrictions are reasonably necessary and not
unduly burdensome to the former employer.
Another reason this area of law continues to be problematic is
the inability of the Pennsylvania justices to reconcile strong differ-
ing views and reach a consensus on the subject. For example, in
Sidco, Justice Roberts wrote the opinion of a three vote plurality,
Justice Pomeroy a concurrence on behalf of himself and Chief Jus-
tice Jones, and Justices Nix and Manderino separate dissents.' In
124. Sidco Paper Co. v. Aaron, 465 Pa. 586, 351 A.2d 250 (1976). Stressing that the
scope of review on an appeal from a preliminary injunctive decree was restricted to whether
there were "any apparently reasonable grounds" for the lower court's decree, Justice Pome-
roy, in his concurring opinion, noted that the employer had a protectable interest in the
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New Castle, in 1978, Justice Nix wrote for a three vote plurality,
while Justices Eagan and Larsen concurred in the result only and
Justices Roberts and O'Brien dissented.125
One thing that the justices do seem to agree on is the way to
handle restrictive covenants of salesmen-enforce them. Perhaps
the reason for the harsh treatment of sales representatives is an
unarticulated belief on the part of the members of the Pennsylva-
nia Supreme Court that it is in this field that competing former
employees have the greatest potential for doing economic harm to
their former employers, particularly by soliciting the same custom-
ers. This writer believes that the courts have been premature in
customer goodwill created by its salesmen. Id. at 602-03, 351 A.2d 258-59 (Pomeroy, J.,
concurring). He further indicated his belief that the covenant in Sidco could be distin-
guished from those with "unlimited scope," as in Reading Aviation Serv. Inc. v. Bertolet,
454 Pa. 488, 311 A.2d 628 (1973), which contained neither a time nor an area limitation. The
covenant in Sidco, Justice Pomeroy maintained, did not suggest "an abuse of superior bar-
gaining power and a callous disregard for an employee's interest in pursuing his chosen
occupation" and, therefore, was not subject to the "extraordinary sanction" of being de-
clared void in its entirety. 465 Pa. at 604-05, 351 A.2d at 259-60 (Pomeroy, J., concurring).
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Nix found the covenant to be "unreasonable" in its
protection of Sidco's business interest. While Justice Nix agreed with the majority that
Sidco did have a protectable interest in goodwill, he nonetheless emphasized that equitable
enforcement of the terms of a covenant must not be permitted to restrain the exercise of the
"innate ability" of a former employee. 465 Pa. at 608-09, 351 A.2d at 261 (Nix, J., dissent-
ing). Only those contacts established during the employment should be protected, noted
Justice Nix, while the establishment of new relationships should not be prevented where
they did not arise from the associations commenced during the employment. Justice Nix
concluded that because the employee's actual business contacts were easily ascertainable, a
geographical limitation on the employee's future employment was unnecessary for lack of a
clear relationship between the customer contacts and the geographical area. Id. at 609-10,
351 A.2d at 262 (Nix, J., dissenting).
In a separate opinion, Justice Manderino also found the covenant "oppressive" to the
former employee because it prohibited the employee from soliciting new customers in new
locations. According to Justice Manderino, the covenant in Sidco failed to specify a limita-
tion on former customers or former sales territories. Such a specifying covenant would ap-
prise the employee of the exact limitations of his future employment. Id. at 611-12, 351 A.2d
at 263 (Manderino, J., dissenting). Justice Manderino also noted that the restrictions of a
covenant should be evaluated at the time the covenant is made and also at the time it is to
be enforced. "[A] restrictive covenant, even if reasonable when made, would not be entitled
to enforcement if at the time enforcement is sought, it would be unreasonable to give effect
to the covenant." Id. at 613-14, 351 A.2d at 264 (Manderino, J., dissenting).
125. New Castle Orthopedic Assocs. v. Burns, 481 Pa. 460, 392 A.2d 1383 (1978). Jus-
tice Roberts, in his dissent, emphasized the "limited scope of review in appeals from decrees
granting or denying a preliminary injunction." Quoting John G. Bryant Co. v. Sling Testing
& Repair Co., 471 Pa. 1, 369 A.2d 1164 (1977), Justice Roberts reaffirmed that the court
shall look to the record to determine if there exists any "apparently reasonable grounds" for
the lower court action. Based on the evidence of appellee's business relationship, Justice
Roberts dissented from the majority. 481 Pa. at 469-70, 392 A.2d at 1388 (Roberts, J.,
dissenting).
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presuming such harm in the absence of proof of its existence or
even its likelihood. From the horror stories of how former salesmen
have brought former employers to near ruin by founding aggres-
sive, competing firms, many courts and many lawyers now seem to
believe that disaster is inevitable when a sales representative is
permitted to compete freely with his former employer. Similar
logic could easily be applied to hairstylists. They are also capable
of taking customers with them, but so are doctors and exec-
utives. 126
There is an urgent need in Pennsylvania for a more fair, uniform
and coherent approach to noncompete clauses in employment
agreements. Both employers and employees have a need to know
whether the agreements which they make will be enforceable. The
approach taken in New Castle is a step toward a more rational,
more predictable, more economically conscious approach to restric-
tive covenants. 127 But much more progress is needed. The following
section of this article will explore a variety of methods by which
the system could be improved.
SOLUTIONS
There are solutions, which could be incorporated into the laws of
every state, solving not only the problems of Pennsylvania, but
also those of other states that follow a case law approach. A variety
of possible reforms will be discussed in this section of the article.
The Statutory Solution
As previously mentioned, eleven states have statutes on the sub-
ject of restrictive covenants in employment contracts."2 8 These
laws do not all approach the subject in the same way. The statute
in Michigan renders all such agreements "illegal and void"1 29 as
against public policy.130 The California statute renders only the of-
fending anti-competition clause invalid131 and does not apply to a
126. See supra notes 37, 75-123 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 87-97 and accompanying text.
128. See supra note 31.
129. MICH. Comp. LAWS § 445.761 (1967).
130. The Michigan statute reads as follows:
All agreements and contracts by which any person, co-partnership or corporation
promises or agrees not to engage in any avocation, employment, pursuit, trade, pro-
fession or business, whether reasonable or unreasonable, partial or general, limited or
unlimited, are hereby declared to be against public policy and illegal and void.
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.761 (1967).
131. Section 16600 of the California Business and Professional Code provides as fol-
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sale of business goodwill3 2 or the dissolution of a partnership.'33
The California approach has been adopted in several other
states.13 4 South Dakota's statute is similar to the California stat-
ute, but it provides for an additional class of enforceable covenants
not to compete. 3 5 Others, like Florida,33 Hawaii,'3 7 and Wiscon-
sin 13 apparently attempt to codify their case law.
A well-drafted statute has numerous advantages over the com-
mon law approach that is presently used by a majority of the
states. The most important advantage is that good legislation is
generally more certain and specific than case law, lending a higher
degree of predictability to a given situation. This is an area of law
where a high level of predictability is essential. After all, it deals
with the question of one's ability to earn a livelihood in one's cho-
sen profession and locale.
Workers are too often faced with the dilemma of whether to
leave an undesirable job. An important factor to be considered is
whether the acceptance of new employment will cause a lawsuit to
be brought by the former employer. More importantly, it must be
clear whether such a lawsuit would succeed. Otherwise, employees
may be left with a Hobson's choice: stay in the undesirable job in
order to avoid legal liability or leave at the risk of precipitating
litigation. Worse still, they may suffer unemployment by virtue of
an injunction, since that is the usual method by which restrictive
covenants are enforced.
lows: "Except as provided in this chapter, every contract by which anyone is restrained from
engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent void." CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 1964).
132. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16601 (West 1964).
133. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16602 (West 1964).
134. See Alabama: ALA. CODE § 8-1-1 (1975); North Dakota: N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06
(1960); and Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. tit. 15 § 217 (1966).
135. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 53-9-8 (1980). South Dakota's statute reads ex-
actly like the California statute except that, in addition to the allowance of restrictions ac-
companying the sale of goodwill or dissolution of a partnership, there is an additional excep-
tion allowing covenants that do not exceed ten years or twenty-five miles. This is an
addition which comes very close to nullifying the positive effects of the statute. Ten years
ought to be a longer time than any diligent former employer would need to preserve his
goodwill.
136. The Florida statute, FLA. STAT. § 542.33 (1980), enforces the agreement, if reason-
ably limited in time and area.
137. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 480-4 (1980). See supra note 31. Subsection (c)(4) of that
statute, however, authorizes only "a covenant or agreement by an employee or agent not to
use the trade secrets of the employer or principal" so long as the covenant follows certain
principles of reasonableness. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 480-4(c)(4) (1980)(emphasis added).
138. WIs. STAT. § 103.465 (1981-82).
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Furthermore, there is an argument to be made that to promote
uniformity and predictability in commercial practice a uniform
law" 9 or federal statute should be enacted to govern the law of
noncompete agreements.1 4 0 It is not uncommon for a corporate em-
ployer to be located in one state but have employees in another or
several other states, particularly if the principal office is located in
a border state or in the nation's northeast corridor. 14 Therefore, a
uniform law would eliminate the possibility of raising entangling
conflict of law issues. Again, it would desirably enhance the level of
predictability for employees who need it.
A new statute on the subject of restrictive covenants, to be effec-
tive, should make it clear whether or not a restrictive covenant will
be enforced. In California, for example, every contract restraining
anyone from engaging in a lawful occupation is to that extent
void.1 4 2 The only exceptions relate to contracts for the sale of good-
will143 or dissolution of a partnership. " " There is very little room
for confusion or uncertainty as to the likelihood of enforcement of
a given restrictive covenant. Furthermore, under California's statu-
tory scheme the balance of power is properly tipped toward the
employee.
Enforcement of all contracts is an alternative means of achieving
certainty. But this alternative is clearly barred by the antitrust
laws, most notably section 1 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits
"every contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several states or with foreign nations
.... ,,5 By a decision of the United States Supreme Court, only
those contracts which unreasonably restrain trade constitute Sher-
man Act violations." 6 However, that brings us full circle: since
some contracts would necessarily be unenforceable because they
139. This idea was suggested to the author by Dennis Kuhn, M.B.A. Director and As-
sistant Professor of Business Law at Villanova University.
140. There is, of course, already a federal statute that arguably regulates this
area-the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). See infra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
141. In Sidco Paper Co. v. Aaron, 465 Pa. 586, 351 A.2d 250 (1976), for example, the
employer was a Pennsylvania corporation but its service area included Virginia, West Vir-
ginia, Maryland, Delaware, New Jersey, New York, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachu-
setts, New Hampshire, and the District of Columbia as well as Pennsylvania. The defendant
employee in that case had worked for the company in Maryland, Delaware, Washington,
D.C. and portions of Virginia and Pennsylvania.
142. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 1964).
143. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16601 (West 1964).
144. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16602 (West 1964).
145. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
146. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
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would unreasonably restrain trade, a lack of certainty is once again
created as to which contracts will be enforced.
The barring of the enforcement of any and all restrictive cove-
nants against employees, as in California, would still leave employ-
ers with traditional common law protections. Intentional interfer-
ence with contraictual relations 14 7 and interference with prospective
advantage 148 (have long been recognized as actionable under tort
law. The former prohibits not only intentional interference with
the existing contracts of another, but also antitrust violations, mis-
use of trade secrets or of confidential information, as well as unfair
competition. 149 The latter prohibits intentional interference with
expectations of future contractual relations, such as the opportu-
nity to obtain cust;mers.150 Injunctive relief is available to prevent
future interference with contract when grounds for such relief are
established and there is a threat of future similar harm.1 5' These
tort actions provide an adequate remedy for the injured employer.
After all, a former employer should not have the right to thwart
any and all competition by former employees. On the other hand,
certain behavior such as the stealing of company files or trade
secrets ought to be subjected to close scrutiny by the courts. Tort
liability should be imposed in appropriate cases.
A statute, then, not unlike California's, would be a viable alter-
native to the present vague, time-consuming reasonableness stan-
dards which have sometimes resulted in discriminatory enforce-
ment. Such a statutory package in combination with existing
intentional tort remedies would go far toward eliminating over-
reaching by employers as well as maximizing clarity and
predictability.
The Judicial Solution
If statutory solutions do not become a reality in more states,
then the judicial approach must be given serious reconsideration.
Restrictive covenants are not made under the most voluntary of
circumstances. The parties do not commonly have equal bargaining
power. The prospective employee wants (and sometimes sorely
needs) the position being offered. The result is that, when the form
147. PROSSER & KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 129 (5th ed. 1984).
148. Id. at § 130.
149. See generally id. at § 129.
150. See generally id. at § 130.
151. See generally id. at § 129.
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contract is presented, he or she simply signs on the dotted line.
Seldom is there negotiation or bargaining over the inclusion of a
restrictive covenant.152 Employment negotiations are, of course, a
function of the supply and demand for employment opportunities.
The supply of jobs, however, is chronically lower than the demand
for them. It is not unlike the problem of an urban dweller who
enters into an apartment lease. The parties'do not quibble over
terms, such as the amount of rent or security deposit or the
amount of notice necessary prior to termination. The landlord sim-
ply presents a standard printed form which is offered to the tenant
on a take it or leave it basis. Conscious of this inequality of bar-
gaining power, the courts should be more circumspect about the
enforcement of restrictive covenants, just as they have been in
landlord-tenant disputes. 5 "
One harsh result that should be avoided wherever possible is the
issuance of an injunction. It puts a productive person out of work,
or at least out of the line or area of work where he or she is likely
to have been most productive. Such hardships should not be
treated lightly. The rule regarding when injunctions may issue
must be taken particularly seriously in restrictive covenant
cases.
1 5 4
First, it is traditional that injunctions are not to be granted un-
less there is an urgent necessity to avoid an injury which would not
be compensable by damages.15 5 The courts must not bypass this
part of the process in the interest of saving time. The employer
must have the burden of proving the urgency, the threat of irrepa-
rable harm and the inadequacy of the usual legal remedy of dam-
ages. He should not be permitted to short circuit needlessly a for-
mer employee's career.
Second, the employer must prove that the granting of an injunc-
tion would cause less harm than the refusal to grant one. 156 This is
152. Other commentators have noted the apparent inequality of bargaining power. See
Closius and Schaffer, Involuntary Nonservitude: The Current Judicial Enforcement of Em-
ployee Covenants Not to Compete-A Proposal for Reform, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 531, 540-41,
560. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 comment g (1979).
153. For example, the implied warranty of habitability has been developed by the
courts in order to neutralize the effect of lease clauses wherein the landlord disclaims the
responsibility of making repairs on residential premises. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 234 (1979). Also, courts have granted relief from unconscionable contracts for the
sale of goods under 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code. U.C.C. § 2-302 (1977).





a difficult criterion to meet when it would mean unemployment,
relocation or diminished earnings for a former employee. The harm
to the employer cannot be merely inferred. It must be proven by
sufficient evidence.
The concept of goodwill must be defined differently if we are to
treat former employees fairly. There exists not only business good-
will but also "employee goodwill." This is clear because when cer-
tain people leave a place of business to work for another or to open
a firm of their own, they are capable of taking with them a sizable
number of the clients whom they had served at their previous
place of employment. If they were not in possession of this per-
sonal magnetism of "employee goodwill," they would be incapable
of retaining those clients or customers. There are, then, competing
goodwills-the goodwill of the business and the goodwill of the em-
ployee. Savvy employers know this and seek to deprive the em-
ployee of his goodwill by requiring that he or she enter into an
employment agreement containing a restrictive covenant. If the
former employee is placed in the position of being unable to com-
pete with the former employer, then his personal goodwill is effec-
tively neutralized.
This phenomenon is generally unfair to the employee. It would
be fair only if the selling of the employee's goodwill were bargained
for. The employee must receive something for the goodwill that he
is giving up. In the absence of a valid contract to the contrary,
bargained-for and supported by consideration, the employee would
have had a right to compete. He could not have taken trade secrets
or engaged in any tortious method of competition, but he could
have competed fairly. Therefore, the restrictive covenant should be
presumed invalid, unless it can be proven that it was indeed the
product of voluntary bargaining.
Courts must be more selective about which, if any, restrictive
covenants to enforce. The reasonableness standard is the predomi-
nant test of enforcement used by today's courts. 157 The determina-
157. In addition to the Pennsylvania cases discussed in this article, see Grant v.
Carotek, Inc., 737 F.2d 410 (4th Cir. 1984); Alston Studios, Inc. v. Lloyd V. Gress & Assocs.,
492 F.2d 279 (4th Cir. 1974); All Stainless, Inc. v. Colby, 364 Mass. 773, 308 N.E.2d 481
(1974); Solari Indus., Inc. v. Malady, 55 N.J. 571, 264 A.2d 53 (1970); Columbia Ribbon and
Carbon Mfg., Co. v. A-1-A Corp., 42 N.Y.2d 496, 369 N.E.2d 4, 398 N.Y.S.2d 868 (1977);
Reed, Roberts Assocs., Inc. v. Strauman, 40 N.Y.2d 303, 353 N.E.2d 590 (1976); Karpinski v.
Ingrasci, 28 N.Y.2d 45, 268 N.E.2d 751 (1971); Purchasing Assocs., Inc. v. Weitz, 13 N.Y.2d
267, 196 N.E.2d 245 (1963); Williams v. Hobbs, 9 Ohio App. 3d 331, 460 N.E.2d 287 (1983);
Raimonde v. Van Vlerah, 42 Ohio St. 2d 21, 325 N.E.2d 544 (1975); Roanoke Eng'g Sales Co.
v. Rosenbaum, 233 Va. 548, 290 S.E.2d 882 (1982); Richardson v. Paxton, Co., 203 Va. 790,
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tion of reasonableness is made on a case by case basis and, at least
with regard to employment contracts, few guidelines for its appli-
cation have emerged in many years of use. Furthermore, reasona-
bleness is generally judged in these cases by the extent of temporal
and geographical restrictions which the covenant places on the em-
ployee. This carries with it the presumption that as long as it does
not restrict the former employee's ability to compete for a long
time or over a wide radius the covenant is somehow fair. However,
"reasonable" restrictions can extend for years and cover whole
states. If the reasonableness standard is retained, it must be made
more rigorous. States could set statutory maximums of, for exam-
ple, one year and fifty miles. Better still, the definition of reasona-
bleness could be made to include more factors, such as the eco-
nomic effect of the covenant upon the employee.
The reasonableness standard when applied to include only tem-
poral and geographic considerations has little merit. Other tests
presently in existence (although not always in use) are more mean-
ingful. For example, the question of whether the employer really
needs the restriction to protect a legitimate property right is cen-
tral. If the restriction is not needed and does not really benefit the
employer or reaches beyond the legitimate protection of the em-
ployer's property rights, it should not be enforced, no matter how
miniscule.
CONCLUSION
A rethinking of the current majority approach to enforcement of
restrictive covenants is long overdue. Employees are compromising
their rights to utilize their talents when they enter into contracts
containing post-employment restrictions. Those who chose to com-
pete in defiance of such restrictions, instinctively recognizing the
unfairness of the situation, often pay for their independence with a
lawsuit and a subsequent injunction. Some employees in Pennsyl-
vania, because of their occupations, are more likely to pay the
price than others.
The current approach tends to turn on the reasonableness of the
contractual restrictions. However, a finding of reasonableness is
often made, almost reflexively, if there are time and area limita-
tions that are not obviously excessively broad. Even when they are
too broad, some states, such as Pennsylvania, would enforce them
nevertheless, after paring them down. This practice must be aban-
127 S.E.2d 113 (1962); Worrie v. Boze, 191 Va. 916, 62 S.E.2d 876 (1951).
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doned due to the consequences that unduly broad restrictions have
upon many former employees who abide by their contract terms,
despite their unreasonableness.
Also, while many states, such as Pennsylvania, give lip service to
the notion of nonenforcement of restrictions that are unnecessary
for the protection of the employer's legitimate business interests,
there is no overt consideration given to what those interests actu-
ally are-and are not. There appears to be an assumption that if
the employer perceives the restrictions to be necessary, then they
must be necessary. Such an approach ignores the fact that the em-
ployer ordinarily has no right to prohibit fair competition. If fair
competition will be injurious to the former employer's business,
then so be it. It is but a normal effect of a free market economy.
Some states have bypassed these problems by enacting statutes
which declare that they will refuse to enforce restrictive covenants
themselves or contracts that contain them. Others have delineated
a narrow range of circumstances under which such clauses will be
enforced. The advantage of such a statutory approach is that it can
eliminate uncertainty as to whether a given restriction will be en-
forced and afford fairer treatment to the employee while leaving
the employer with the traditional protection against tortious meth-
ods of competition-the only protection to which he would have
been legally entitled in the absence of a valid agreement to the
contrary.
The states that retain a case law approach to this subject must
begin to require strict proof that the restraints are necessary to
protect legitimate employer interests without placing an undue
burden on the employee. Also, there must be an acknowledgement
of the inequality of bargaining power between the employer and
employee, carrying with it the likelihood that the employee has not
really intended to bargain away his future employment rights.
The wholesale issuance of injunctions as a remedy for breach of
a restrictive covenant must be avoided at all costs. The fact that
most people need to work in order to earn a living cannot be cal-
lously disregarded.
Finally, the courts must come to the recognition that the em-
ployee's talents are his own. Absent clear and convincing proof to
the contrary, there must be a presumption that he has not bar-
gained away the future use of those talents. Professor Williston re-
ferred to this concept in section 1646 of the revised edition of his
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treatise on contracts, 158 and it is a fitting summary of the nearly
forgotten notion. It is ironic that Professor Williston's statement is
quoted with approval in a Pennsylvania decision, Van Products v.
General Welding.15e It reads as follows:
A man's aptitudes, his skill, his dexterity, his manual or mental ability-all
those things which in sound philosophical language are not objective, but
subjective-they may and they ought not to be relinquished by a servant;
they are not his master's property; they are his own property; they are him-
self. There is no public interest which compels the rendering of those things
dormant or sterile or unavailing; on the contrary, the right to use and to
expand his powers is advantageous to every citizen and may be highly so for
the country at large.1 60
158. S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1646 (rev. ed. 1937).
159. 419 Pa. 248, 260, 213 A.2d 769, 776 (1965).
160. S. WILLISTON, supra note 158, at § 1646.
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